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Civil service reform is not new to the development debate in Pakistan. The role of 
bureaucracy is discussed every now and then. Civil service reform is nowadays quite 
uniformly discussed as a major problem for development in Pakistan, or at least so it is 
considered. Most of the blame for policy and programme failures is assigned to the civil 
service. Recognising the importance, or persistence of the problem, governments over 
time have attempted to deal with the issue by setting up committees and commissions, 
many  times  in  this  paper  I  am  presenting  a  discussion  of  some  pre-eminent  issues 
besetting the civil service in Pakistan in my view unless these issues are addressed at the 
outset  no  meaningful  reform  can  be  formulated  or  implemented.  Addressing  them  is 
paramount for setting an agenda for the reform.  
Civil service reform due to the complex nature of the problem works at various 
levels simultaneously. As long as this does not over simplify and aggregate problems it 
can work well. But for good results disaggregating problems will be required. What is 
required to be done in one branch might not be needed in the other. Legal instruments 
with a general and most wide ranging application should deal with basic principles of 
organisation while providing for differential rules to emerge and give detailed structures. 
A set of actions to deal with the basic structures will be part of any reform but sometimes 
what remains ignored is that actions are also needed in other spheres of Pakistan’s public 
life without which the reform in civil service itself will not attain the cherished goals. The 
paper takes up discussion of issues from these levels of consideration. It begins with the 
aggregation framework and goes on to highlight the most urgently felt area of local civil 
service. It ends by highlighting the complementary actions.  
In this paper I discuss a list of issues for setting the civil service reform agenda in 
Pakistan. I regard them as pre-eminent for they can have a major effect on the reform 
efforts, their organisation, management arrangements and results.  
 
2.  THE AGGREGATION PROBLEM 
It might seem innocuous or even attractive to deal with the civil service at an aggregate 
level when conceiving a reform. The attraction lies in the possibility of bringing in a wide 
ranging transformation which renders all state institutions immediately effective. But whether 
it is feasible is a question requiring careful consideration; an additional question is if such an 
option will delay or expedite the over due change in civil service systems.  
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Technically, and quite literally, most of the public sector employees whether they 
are doctors, engineers, teachers, revenue collectors, police or secretariat employees are 
‘civil servants.’ This is true if we use the legal definition or its related case law. When a 
commission takes up civil service reform most often all branches and categories of the 
public sector employees are included in its purview. From one angle it seems to be a 
worthy  assignment  whereby  much  what  is  preventing  the  society  from  reaching  its 
potential  can  be  dealt  with  by  a  single  commission.  It  is  based  on  the  hope  that  a 
commission  or  an  agency  can  centrally  conceive,  organise  and  manage  the  required 
change and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector. But realistically 
a commission attempting to reform such a diverse group of public sector employees is an 
very  challenging  proposition,  to  say  the  least.  Reforming  the  institutional  structures, 
career patterns, appointment, promotion and transfer mechanisms, pay and compensation 
packages, retirement matters, performance evaluation, work environment, efficiency and 
discipline and controlling laws of the civil service all should then be addressed within the 
framework.  From  another  perspective  too  a  broad  based  civil  service  reform  is  an 
attractive proposition. If possible it is efficient for the government to achieve results with 
the least possible effort. 
But  the  issue  for  consideration  is  whether  it  is  feasible  or  even  advisable  to 
conceptualise a civil service reform at an aggregate level. There are several reasons why 
aggregation of this kind, for conceptualising, organising and managing reform, is not a 
good idea.  
First of all it places limitations on the choices of the reformers. This issue can be 
highlighted by an example. For instance, several times pay rises have been given in the 
recent years. Under the compulsion of treating all categories of civil servants through the 
prism of the 22 pay scales, an increase affects a broad swathe of civil servants in the 
society. I term this as the uniformist approach. It is premised on the foundation that all 
civil servants are underpaid and they are not getting their market wages and therefore 
compensation needs to be increased. But it doesn’t consider the fact that the market wage 
for  doctors,  engineers,  teachers  and  revenue  collectors  who  have  qualifications  and 
experiences to be placed in BPS-17, to name a few, are not going to be same. If their 
baseline salaries are similar then the differences in their market wages and what they are 
getting are not the same. Some of them are drawing half the salary given the market wage 
for a comparable positions while another might be getting only ten percent less than what 
the market would offer for the undertaking. Giving them the same pay raise therefore 
does not seem to be moving them closer to their market wage except that reduces the 
aggregate difference. Beyond that declining number the mischief is not addressed. Some 
or  many  civil  servants  still  might  be  getting  wages  different  from  the  market  wage 
creating perverse incentives and reducing productivity, given that the number of hours 
that they can offer to work is fixed in the formal sense. Dealing with them at an aggregate 
level therefore means that the reform abstracts from the factors which have an important 
effect on the work and productivity of the civil service.  
The uniform pay scales in my view is an unnecessary constraint. It may have some 
uses but they far outweigh the rigidity they bring into the structure of civil service which 
should be shaped to match the needs of very diverse roles of the state. A false sense of 
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of reform. When officials differ in their tasks and qualifications, when they vary in their 
responsibilities and duties a uniform pay scale system cannot be easily justifiable; but 
justifiability let alone it has been taken as unquestionable corner stone of the civil service 
structure. No reform seeks to evaluate it or measure the extent of rigidity is creates for the 
state  limiting  its  options  is  creating  offices  and  positions  according  to  the  nature  of 
assignment. Seemingly the structure of the civil service in conceived and brought up 
around the artificial accounting simplicity of uniform pay scales. But this is just a simple 
introduction to this problem. 
It  is  seldom  considered  by  any  civil  service  reform  group  to  serious  create  a 
structure where differences in job description, qualifications, responsibility and duties are 
open heartedly recognised.  Apparently reform is confined to tinkering  with pays and 
allowances,  which have long lost relevance or accommodating pent  up grievances of 
some groups and giving them a greater room for promotions. Without questioning the 
validity of these actions, I am asserting that the issues hampering the performance of civil 
service are much greater than removing bottlenecks in the way of a few civil servants 
belonging  to  some  group.  No  meaningful  reform  can  take  place  in  such  a  confining 
framework, where a reform commission cannot abdicate such an artificial and unrealistic 
construct. A civil service which manages a complex country and its numerous services 
cannot be fashioned on a long out of fashion communist lack of imagination.  
Civil  service  has  to  emerge  out  of  it  confining  uniform  pay  scales  and  allow 
sufficient  variations  in  the  pay  and  compensation  packages,  matching  them  with  the 
diversity  of  functions  and  required  qualifications.  The  uniformity  of  pay  scales 
frameworks restricts options in two ways: firstly, it reduces the possible options before 
any commission of treating categories of civil service according to their market wages; 
secondly, it rules out the option of  managing reform  in  all sectors over an extended 
timeline; all sectors have to be treated at once. Its seems like a truism but nevertheless it 
is  worth  emphasising  that  doctors  should  be  treated  differently  than  road  engineers; 
teachers should not be assumed to be the same as revenue officials. And so on so forth.  
Moving away from uniform pay scales will require the courage to proclaim that 
there is  no attempt to achieve an artificial  uniformity; that the  government  will treat 
people according to their job descriptions and responsibilities. It should be said and made 
clear that all jobs are not alike and nobody should spend much time proving it otherwise 
by getting pieces about victimising published in the press. It is amazing that articles in the 
press agitated for treating all BPS-22 officials alike claiming that any benefit given to a 
federal secretary should be automatically given to any BPS-22 official. Again without 
questioning  the  validity  of  the  case  that  I  cite,  this  is  an  example  of  the  uniformity 
principle  ruling  out  any  management  option  that  attempts  to  match  civil  servant 
compensation with the nature of the job.   
At the same time the syndrome of playing the underdog should be checked. The 
civil service reform should not be treated eternally toward redress of grievance of those 
who have been unfairly treated only. Notwithstanding the importance of meting a fair 
treatment to all civil servants, disregarding groups, it is also important to recognise that 
the basis of claims should more than the scale of number of years; other considerations of 
performance, even if painful, should be attempted. The reform should be dealt within an 
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those who stand out, individuals as well as services, are ridiculed and penalised while 
mediocrity becomes the best hiding cloak for large numbers. Some of the reform efforts 
have encouraged such behaviour and even institutionalised it. Civil service reform efforts 
by  pandering  to  accumulated  grievances,  without  sifting  for  grain  from  chaff,  have 
encouraged emergence of classical Weberian criticisms.  
One of the options that should be on the table for civil service is to build around 
the  prestige  that  some  of  the  services  offer.  Candidates  and  later  officials  certainly 
consume prestige and social recognition that comes with being in a service in addition to 
the compensation package.
1  That these non-monetary benefits are an important variable 
in determining the utility that individuals derive from being in the service is demonstrated 
from the indirect evidence of their high demand even when they offered below market 
salaries. An argument can be made that it could be associated with the rents that came 
with some of the positions also in addition to the present value of life time benefits of a 
secure tenure. But the factors can only be established  with empirical research on the 
subject.  Some  efforts  have  taken  the  approach  of  whittling  down  prestige  as  well  as 
giving new names for unrecognisable personae. Such an approach means ignoring the 
advantages that some public sector employment in Pakistan has, that can serve as factors 
in creating structures of such services.   
 
3.  DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The issue of problem statement and defining TORs for the reform committees is 
connected with the first one: if the TORs are very broad and encompass a wide ranging 
effort at improving the performance of the civil service in the country
2 they present a 
plethora  of  issues  to  the  committee  members  from  which  to  choose  and  priortise. 
Sometimes the reform committees can use this flexibility to set their own agenda but at 
others the broad TORs can themselves generate enough pressure on the committee to 
render  it  ineffectual.  Setting  clear  and  doable  TORs  is  the  first  step  in  undertaking 
reform. Some of this discussion therefore attends to this issue. Defining TORs and the 
scope of work will enable a commission or a committee to focus their limited time and 
resources on a specific agenda. This job cannot be abdicated to the committee itself. It is 
not an unknown practice where reform institutions have continually solicited tasks and 
assignments  to  perpetuate  themselves,  in  accordance  with  the  known  mode  of 
government entities. Sufficient understanding and debate within the government should 
precede  writing  TORs  of  any  reform  entity.  This  prior  discussion  should  attempt  to 
conceptualise a view of the problem and prioritise areas for desired action. Doing this 
will serve the subsequent committee well and be useful and purposeful. In other words it 
means that the public sector should move away from tendency of outsourcing its basic 
function, namely understanding the problem it wishes to resolve.  
A  contrary  approach  also  suffers  from  limitations.  In  some  other  cases  the 
committee jobs have boiled down to very narrow and specific actions like reducing the 
number of tiers in the federal secretariat. Without going into the merits of the proposal 
the issue under discussion here is the merit of the approach where a narrow focus on a 
perceived problem seems to overtake the need for analysis of the larger issues besetting 
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the civil service structure, ethos and morale. On the one hand it is important to look at the 
issue more closely without painting it with a very broad brush but on the other the TORs 
should not preclude a comprehensive situation analysis within the defined scope. Where a 
preconceived idea becomes the basis of reform, it defines the problem statement (which it 
should), forces an already voiced analysis on the committee and preordains a solution. If 
such a component of the problem did exist, where the analysis was clear and the solution 
were at hand a committee or a commission would not be required to delve into it again. I 
consider some of the work of the CAR commission’s
3 to fall in this category. Reducing 
the number of tiers in the federal secretariat per se did not make the civil service more 
effective.  
 
4.  IMPORTANCE OF SECTOR-SPECIFIC ACTIONS 
For a meaningful reform defining the civil service seems a truism. But this step is 
essential to the success of design, implementation, organisation and management of the 
reform. I am not challenging the widely held perception that the whole range of civil 
service needs reform; nor that it is urgent and it is critical to achieving development goals 
in the country. Here the point is that the reform agenda should look at what is the most 
suitable  way  of  undertaking  it.  Notwithstanding  the  desirability  of  the  wide-ranging 
reform, a simultaneous broad based restructuring and reorientation is such a major task 
that  it  falls  under  its  own  weight  once  the  initiative  takes  off.  In  many  cases  the 
uniformity principle automatically imposes a framework where all groups and branches 
are mostly a simultaneous focus of the reform effort: it goes without saying that too broad 
a focus means no focus at all in the effort.  
Smaller and more focused initiatives have met more success. The unsung heroes of 
this kind can be found in the development sectors where projects or programmes have 
brought in important even though unnoticed changes. For instance the ongoing work on 
instituting  contract  employment  in  service  delivery  projects  in  Punjab  in  one  such 
example.
4  For  instance,  in  Punjab  without  being  called  a  civil  service  reform  the 
Department  of  Health  has  brought  in  new  rules  to  recruit  and  manage  doctors  on 
contract.
5  It did not adopt the uniformist approach nor did it attempt to change the whole 
range of civil service at once. Here again the objective is not to discuss the merits of the 
contract employment itself or go into the details of it provisions; I am only highlighting a 
workable approach to adopting change where it is required. All this while keeping the 
agenda doable.  
Another important point relating to the scope of reform in a given time period is 
the  capacity  of  the  state  itself  to  undertake  and  absorb  reform.  Can  for  instance  the 
government change over to a performance budgeting systems together with performance 
management  in  all  departments  at  once.  Too  broad  an  agenda  where  it  ignores  the 
capacity of the public sector to change ignores two consequences: one, that such a broad 
action will not implemented and whatever part is implemented will come a huge cost in 
loss of service. Second, sometimes when seemingly it is being implemented the actual on 
ground structures do not necessarily adopt the shape or acquire the expected attributes. 
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Announcing that a law  will render a department people friendly does not necessarily 
translate  into  reality.  A  recent  case  of  reform  will  highlight  this  objective.  The 
implementation of local government laws in the country over the last five years have 
brought  in  enormous  changes  in  the  structures,  rules,  reporting  obligations  and 
nomenclature.  But  the  structures  on  the  ground  and  their  functioning  remains  much 
different from the spirit and sometimes even the letter of the law.
6  It is still a valid 
argument to say that such an approach does propel things toward the target, but it also 
ignores that fact that in terms of good management it does not take into account the 
enormous cost of disruptions or the private cost to civil servants of adopting to the new 
procedures and structures, sometimes according to their own interpretations. In case of 
local  government  law  the  change  was  easier  in  one  way  that  it  didn’t  change  the 
procedures much but changed designations and the interagency relations. But when a 
civil service reform alters the way in which an office functions it will require much more 
support and management.  
Another important aspect of the broad based approach is that it averages out the 
issues  in  different  groups  and  branches  of  the  civil  service.  Admittedly  there  are 
characteristics common to all public sector organisation.
7  For instance any civil servant 
will testify to the fact of low compensation and its consequent low motivation for his 
work. But such common areas will be few and in any case the best approach to deal with 
them is not at the uniform level, as argued earlier in the paper. Such broad issues might 
need sector based solutions for each of them will may very well vary from the rest. The 
more  important  issues  are  imbedded  in  each  sector’s  characteristic  organisation,  its 
structure, it work environment and the nature of issues it deals with. A patwari’s reform 
cannot be the same as that of a road engineer. If the two are averaged and seen through 
the scope of the Civil Servants Act,
8  the reform may not be meaningful to either or both 
of  them.  The  statutes  provide  the  basic  principles,  while  the  rules  and  other  policy 
instruments are the ones which shape a cadre. The latter should receive much attention 
and it is here that the bulk of the sector based approach will need to focus.  
Treating services differently and according to the nature of their work will given 
more space to the reform effort. An important omission in some reform efforts has been 
not  to  distinguish  between  standard  enforcement  and  service  delivery  assignments. 
Structures and rules governing to kinds of civil service roles differ. For the former, the 
structure needs to insulate the civil servant from some of the immediate effects of her 
actions. For the latter it will not work. The civil servant has to be immersed in the effects 
of his work to be in his best responsive role. For the former a regulator is a prototype. Her 
work will require her to be protected from the consequences of her decisions. She will 
need  insulation  to  acquire  sufficient  operational  space  within  the  social  and  cultural 
mores to regulate the assigned sector. Institutional structures, profile and rules will be the 
building blocks of her institutional space. On the other hand a TO Infrastructure with the 
important  responsibility  of  providing  municipal  services  to  the  residents  in  a  local 
jurisdiction. For this person the institutional structure, rules and accountability will be 
different to make his work responsive to locally voiced concerns.  
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A connected issue to this discussion is the federal or national level efforts of civil 
service reform. By definition such efforts average out civil service diversity, adopt a 
uniform approach and attempt broad based solutions. With the limited scope of such a 
mission their effects cannot be far reaching unless they seek to bring ‘change’ and then 
let  the  real  managers  deal  with  the  consequences,  shape  the  institutions  and  their 
operations  as  it  suits  the  field  level  wisdom  or  announce  major  changes  and  then 
implement through piece meal compromises, adjustments without a plan and letting the 
force of events themselves shape things over the medium term. With this approach the 
actual change and reform comes in the second phase where operational heads occupy the 
newly created space within the statutory domain to redefine their institutional practices. 
This approach cannot be totally discounted but as argued earlier it has limitations and 
costs  which  are  often  unrecognised.  A  much  lower  cost  reform  will  be  managed  at 
different  levels  of  government,  comprising  different  sector  based  efforts  following 
appropriate  timelines  without  the  compulsion  of  big  bang  simultaneity.  Civil  service 
reform is in these terms sometimes conceived as an ongoing process, without a clear 
beginning or end.
9  
Within  the  general  attributes  each  branch  of  civil  service  merits  a  specific 
treatment. Investments in acquiring qualification and differences in the nature of work are 
so wide apart that they cannot be ignored. Each type requires that it be treated according 
to its specific attributes; the design of the institutions, rules, incentives on performance 
and career patterns requires refined calibration to match the specific institutional design 
to the type of civil service. These matters are not amenable to broad based treatment. The 
best way to deal with them is not passing statutory amendments either. Laws remain at 
the  level  of  setting  basic  principles.  If  they  go  beyond  setting  such  principles  they 
become vehicles for ephemeral policy decisions not necessarily suited to formal statutory 
attire.  It is pertinent to mention the recent attempts like the amendments to the local 
government ordinances to create a ‘district service.
10  It sets a good principle. Creating a 
local level civil service is not per se controversial. But beyond the basic principle comes 
the hard part of designing individual career paths, rules of conduct, incentive systems and 
all  else  that  goes  with  a  ‘service’.  Each  province,  and  within  each  province  the 
departments  have  particular  characteristics  which  provide  the  site  and  material  for 
erecting new structures. Unfortunately, the creation of the district cadres does not follow 
automatically from legal amendments. The progress of the district service is therefore a 
case in the point. 
 
5.  LOCAL CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 
At  the  same  time  discussion  on  local  cadres  or  civil  service  requires  further 
consideration. The structures have been changed and the current rules governing the civil 
service  in  the  local  governments  are  at  best  an  anachronism.  The  local  government 
reform  built  on  the  principles  of  decentralisation  created  local  structures  with  local 
accountability.  The  political  institutions  assumed  the  charge  of  policy  making  and 
government in 2001. Over the last five years controls have been passed down and in 
some cases important reversals also took place. All of these should be seen in the context 
 
9Dugget (2002).  
10Pakistan (2005). Musharraf Rasool Cyan  1248
of provincial policy makers responding to pressing needs of development.
11  But this ever 
changing context for the work of civil service is not unparalleled given the international 
cases: allocation of functions and review is a continual process in the earlier stages of 
development.  
But beyond the assignment of departmental functions and responsibilities comes 
the major question of setting the details of local civil service, its attributes and nature. 
Again the general advice and broad principles will not be of great help. To illustrate the 
point further let me present a hypothetical case, where the information is based on 
actual facts. The TMA in Uthal requires town planning and finance managers.
12  Its 
requirement faces the constraint of its financial capacity. TMA Uthal needs the services 
in the spirit of decentralisation; matching needs and capacity to pay with expertise it 
may be able to procure the services of a Mr.A with a certain level of qualifications and 
experience.  At  the  same  time  Ms.C  is  also  available  but  her  qualifications  and 
experience is higher than A and she would like to be paid at a higher level. Quetta 
Town  I  needs  the  services of  a  town  planning  official  with  much  higher  expertise. 
Suppose  C’s  resume  matches  the  requirements  of  Town  I.  Now  at  the  optimum  A 
should  work  for  Uthal  and  C  should  work  for  Town  I,  and  to  ensure  that  one 
mechanism can be developed by writing the requirements clearly along with offering 
compensation packages which attract A to Uthal and C to Town I. The compensation 
package in Town I will of course will be higher and C will self-select to work for Town 
I  ensuring  that  A  works  for  Uthal.  In  the  civil  service  this  kind  of  a  quasi-market 
mechanism may or may not work due to the rigidities and unsure supply of expertise in 
the  short  run.  If  the  incentives  are  clear  and  significant,  in  the  limit  all  kinds  of 
expertise will be available in the market. If it is not possible to create such a pure 
mechanism, the structure of the civil service and its rule and regulations will need to be 
designed in a manner which keeps it closest to the pure mechanism.  
The local level the civil service reform has some competing objectives, generated 
due  to  the  smaller  size  of  jurisdictions.  The  most  important  ones  are:  (a)  ensuring 
appropriate expertise at all levels and to all categories of local government; (b) ensuring 
adequate control of the local executive over the local civil service. The first objective is a 
necessary  condition  for  improvements  in  local  service  delivery.  Without  appropriate 
expertise  the  local  governments  cannot  live  up  to  the  expectations  of  their  residents, 
manage  increase  in  finances  and  convert  resources  into  tangible  services.  The 
decentralisation reform aimed at unleashing new energies into public management;
13  it 
anticipated people’s participation in local public  sector  management and bring in the 
much needed zest for responding to people’s needs. One of main forces behind the latest 
round of decentralisation reform in Pakistan has been the quest to create responsive and 
locally  managed  systems  for  improved  service  delivery.  These  expectations  have  not 
been  immediately  realised.  The  formal  controls  have  shifted  to  the  local  political 
executive to a large extent but service delivery systems continue to be weak. Programmes 
investing resources are increasingly realising that the capacity of the local civil service 
remains a major constraint.  
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The  immediate  and  transition  solution  aimed  at  providing  appropriate  capacity 
through assigning provincial civil servants to manage most of the local functions. All 
important local offices are filled up by provincial civil servants belonging to various 
cadres. This solution has worked well in ensuring that transition did not cause any major 
disruptions  in  service  delivery.  But  over  the  longer  run  local  governments  need  to 
establish more control over their civil servants. Here a major challenge is presented to 
conceiving  a  reform  which  while  balancing  against  other  objectives  provides  the 
appropriate  level  of  expertise  to  local  governments.  In  many  areas  the  expertise  is 
seriously deficient or absent. Town planning is an area where trained experts are not 
available to a large majority of local governments. The rural TMAs have inherited the 
town planning mandate from the earlier urban local governments (in the city districts the 
function has been given to the towns). But the expertise is not available in good enough 
numbers even in the provincial governments. Consequently, TMAs have not been able to 
take up this function and deliver results on another area which received a lot of attention 
in the discussion leading up to local government reform. Now an important dimension of 
this problem illustrates an important general issue in local civil service reform: if the 
local governments are not constrained by any ban on recruitment will Uthal be able to 
procure the services of a trained local or non-local town planner. And if the labour market 
can supply such an expert does it have the capacity to manage and pay such an expert. In 
this case it is given that the expert, if he is non-local will need to be paid an adequate 
sum, over and above the salary, to cover the cost of moving residence and a monthly sum 
to ensure that he works away from a big city. The second dimension concerns the TMA’s 
technical capacity to provide institutional support to him to lay out plans, implement 
standards  and  manage  urban  growth  and  expansion.  A  provincial  or  sub-provincial 
organisation may be the best suited mechanism to provide such technical support and 
periodic mentoring. The illustration explains the issue that creating local capacity for 
local  functions,  notwithstanding  the  desirability  of  such  an  outcome,  is  not  merely  a 
matter of amending rules or even taking a policy decision to remove the fetters on local 
governments to hire experts on their own.  
Simultaneously, attention is to be given to the second dimension alluded to above: 
the local executive needs to be incharge of the local civil service. Without such controls 
the  political  executive  cannot  manage  the  local  service  delivery  and  be  clearly  held 
accountable by the electorate. Their capacity to manage their policy agenda is severely 
limited without such controls. The ideal solution will be to allow local governments raise 
their own cadres. The appointment, promotion and transfer policy and systems will in 
such a case be totally and completely within the domain of local government. Having 
such a system, it is felt, may not be possible except in departments and branches where 
the local labour market is adequate in size. Under the previous local government laws 
council employees belonged to this category. Elaborate rules and regulation are available 
for these categories of employment.
14  The practice is a good experience to build on. 
Even prior to decentralisation the methodology of local hire was in vogue but since the 
departments were provincial the employees despite local hiring remained provincial. It is 
not difficult to change the nature of employment from provincial to local in all such 
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cases. The example would be primary school teachers, junior level hospital staff or the 
ministerial staff in all the departments.  
But the real challenge comes when we go into areas requiring a labour market 
larger than the one inside the boundaries of a local government or where the role of the 
civil servant is such that it needs operational autonomy. For such areas, local cadres are 
not the best option. It requires innovative thinking to balance the two objectives.  
The traditional framework of civil service does not provide many options to deal 
with all these situations. Civil servants from provincial cadres can be posted to local 
governments, drawing upon a larger pool but then they are not fully accountable to local 
executive, weakening local accountability. It has been demonstrated that this remains a 
major issue in decentralisation;
15 a somewhat unfinished agenda of decentralisation in 
Pakistan. 
Before going into further discussion of this matter it is important to highlight a few 
points germane to its consideration. Reform is unnecessarily presented and seen as an 
anti-civil servant move. This springs from the unfortunate attitude demonstrated by some 
of those espousing change. Although it seems simplistic to attempt putting together a 
system  without  the  participation  of  civil  service  or  attempting  to  portray  them  as  a 
colonial vestige. It runs counter to the fact that a modern civil service is part of every 
nation, with or without a colonial past. Needless to say that the epithet of colonial is 
reserved for the civil service alone among all the modern institutions of the state. In other 
countries  with  a  colonial  phase  in  history,  civil  service  development  recognises  the 
impact but a more rigorous analysis finds that the ethos changes over time and responds 
to new phases.
16  It is important to emphasise that if the attitude demonstrates a serious 
understanding then it militates against the reform itself. Modern civil service is supposed 
to apply rules and regulations with scant disregard to any considerations except the rule 
of law. A tarnished image, where people in the government themselves contribute to it, 
does not work in favour of building an environment for diligent work. At a more serious 
level it reduces reform to changing titles and the compulsion of presenting offices as new. 
Serious understanding is replaced by populist compulsions. For a meaningful reform this 
needs to be traded in favour of efforts to analyse the factors which work against good 
working of the civil service.  
There can be several ways in which a local civil service can be developed. A brief 
description of a possible option is presented here to illustrate the main point of discussion 
in this paper; namely that it will require an innovative approach which might not be 
amenable to a uniformist legal framework. For the local civil service instead of having 
provincial  or  local  cadres  in  cases  where  neither  is  suitable  a  third  category  can  be 
created which can be termed as the locally serving officials
17 This will be a kind of civil 
service cadres which are controlled by both the province and the local governments to 
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(a) The  Services  and  General  Administration  Department  works  out  the 
projections of numbers of positions in various categories and provides them to 
the Public Service Commission;  
(b) The Commission selects the officials on a competitive basis and places them 
on a selected list; 
(c) The Services Department arranges pre-service or periodic training, as the case 
may be, for the individuals on the select list; 
(d) The local governments advertise positions with qualifications and experience 
requirements. The requirements worked out in consultation and with approval 
of Services Department; 
(e) Only individuals on the select list are eligible to apply;  
(f) The officials for the position in local government are selected by a committee 
which includes a provincial departmental representative;  
(g) The official upon selection is placed on a renewable or non-renewable contract 
with the local government following a contract format vetted by the Services 
Department; and 
(h) For the senior positions, performance evaluation is reviewed by the provincial 
departments  and  for  a  sample  of  officials  the  Services  Department  reviews 
performance evaluation and reports on the civil service  management of the 
local government on an annual basis.  
The  mechanism  can  be  applied  allowing  different  degrees  of  roles  to  local 
government.  A  factor  which  is  kept  in  consideration  should  be  the  size  of  the  local 
government. It is evident that Lahore and Karachi should be given much bigger role in 
hiring and managing their civil service; to varying degree the similar roles should be 
given to other cities.  
 
6.  COMPLEMENTARY ACTIONS 
The discussion about civil service will remain incomplete without talking about 
important  factors  which  shape  or  de-shape  the  rules  under  which  the  civil  servants 
operate. For instance: is the civil servant an agency to follow orders and do the bidding of 
the executive or is he to implement standards enshrined in the law. Is she to implement 
programmes and policies without comments or is she part of the policy making itself as 
well. Most views will point out that in practice a civil servant is partly both. This is again 
a basic question rendered much easier once it is possible to demystify by disaggregating 
as discussed above. Clearly some civil servants fall primarily in one category while the 
role of others falls in the second most of the time. For the former the structure and rules 
have to be different than the latter. Historically the Deputy Commissioner became an 
office which was performing both kinds of functions. Under the first mentioned above, 
his role as district magistrate or as collector were the prime examples; the expectation 
was to implement law and standards and work outside the influence of the local elite. 
Under  the  second  category  of  functions  was  his  role  of  working  as  a  coordinator  of 
development and service delivery  where he was to work with the residents and their 
representatives. In the new local government system the second role has been emphasised 
and therefore the office of the DCO works under the Nazim. At the same time it seems Musharraf Rasool Cyan  1252
that the control of the local Nazim over the DCO has been uncomfortably dealt with. The 
local government ordinances also place the responsibility of maintaining standards on the 
DCO; in such a situation what is a civil servant supposed to do: carry out the orders of the 
elected official or implement the standards when the two are in conflict. 
This  is  basic  question  which  reforms  sometimes  do  not  adequately  address. 
Connected  with  this  is  the  notion  of  the  supremacy  of  the  elected  office  over  the 
appointed civil servant. Various rules and amendments to laws over time have attempted 
to  address  this  issue.  It  is  clearly  a  complex  one  and  it  is  not  easy  to  address  it 
simplistically. Sometime previous reforms have tilted it one way or tried to calibrate it by 
refining the systems toward the other side. It seems the efforts have worked but to a 
limited extent. All principles in political science and management theories are relevant to 
this discussion. But to design a system of civil service which works according the cultural 
and  social  norms  of  Pakistan  a  refined  combination  of  all  the  principles  is  required. 
Skirting around the issue will not help.  
Again the local government system will highlight this issue very clearly. Local 
government officials are unhappy many times with the instructions that they receive from 
their elected executive. In turn the elected officials report that they find the local civil 
service does not implement their programmes. To add to this working environment the 
provincial government creates another set of priorities for the civil servants. Those who 
work with such competing prioritisation and still manage to achieve success are worthy 
of admiration.  
The supremacy of the elected representative is not worth questioning. The elected 
representatives frame policies and laws under a constitutional mandate and have the final 
word in most cases. Exceptions to the rule being violations of a law for the time being in 
force or court directions which may countermand their directions. At the same it will be 
useful to bring out in this discussion that the supremacy of an elected representative or 
official stems  from representation of the people. His legal  mandate provides him the 
wherewithal to carry out people’s wishes into law and general public policy. It has been 
clearly established in all functioning democracies that the laws and such directions are 
applicable for the wider public good and generally should not discriminate to favor a few 
individuals. Therefore, the sanctity of the mandate does not extend to particular directions 
in  individual  cases.  The  ongoing  conflicts  in  recruitments  or  posting  of  education 
department  officials  test  the  strengthen  of  our  system.  Civil  service  reform  should 
enunciate the principle of supremacy and at the same time lay down its boundaries.  
Another dimension stemming from this discussion is the conflict between the state 
and civil servants perpetuated in the media.
19  Notwithstanding the populist advantage of 
claims of about the civil service being a colonial vestige, such claims have been working 
against a meaningful reform. Claimants create a self-imposed compulsion of undoing 
institutions to satisfy the need to be seen as undoing the colonial past. It shifts attention 
away from creating a system where meritorious civil servants can functions without fear 
or retribution while they are implementing the laws and policies set by the government. 
To ensure a motivated civil service committed to implementing laws and policies the 
civil servants should have adequate access to redress of grievance. Where there is abuse 
of power by elected officials the system should provide for remedial measures. 
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To remove the sense of fear created by the populist statements and bring the civil 
servants on the right side of reform among other actions the reform should explicitly 
declare  its  attention  of  improving  their  work  environment.  Civil  service  should  be 
protected against knee jerk reactions. They should have access to redress of grievance 
mechanisms. Complimentary actions to civil service reform will build higher chances of 
its success. One of them will be to lay out a redress of grievance mechanism.  
Simultaneous  treatment  of  standard  enforcing  offices  and  service  delivery 
departments creates certain confusions. Sometimes the attempts to reconcile the two lead 
to  half-hearted  compromises.  When  undertaken  without  regard  to  this  distinction  the 
outcome is at best an unknown arrangement. This is best illustrated by the police reform 
undertaken since 2002. On the one hand the district magistrate’s accountability and in-
built mechanism has been removed to provide autonomy, and on the other the public 
safety  commissions  have  been  created  to  provide  the  same.  The  former  was  an 
institutional mechanism to provide an accountable working environment to police and 
allow it adequate but well defined space for enforcing law without trampling on civil 
rights. The state of its functioning is a separate discussion not part of this discussion. At 
the  same  time  to  give  police  more  operational  autonomy,  political  oversight  was 
removed. The 2005 amendments to the law have swung the system to some unknown 
point where the agencies have to perform their roles discovering through experience at 
what point their institutional longitudes cross the informal latitudes and power relations. 
This is not a good recipe for development of professionalism or service to the ordinary 
poor citizen in Pakistan’s cities or villages.  
The second dimension is therefore important in contemplating civil service reform. 
Separating the enforcement of standards role from service delivery creates opportunities 
for the reform to give individual and particular treatment to departments and entities 
within them, instead of following a general approach. No role in the public sector will be 
probably  purely  one  or  the  other  exclusively.  But  some  offices  have  more  of  one 
compared with the other. Distinguishing between the two kinds of roles will help create 
institutional  structures,  write  rules  and  lay  out  accountability  mechanisms  which  suit 
them.  In  the  service  delivery  departments  the  operational  controls  of  the  political 




In conclusion I would like to state the basic argument of this paper again. Civil 
service in Pakistan has many strengths and suffers from a large number of weaknesses. 
These should be analysed professionally and the temptation toward populism avoided. 
The foremost task toward setting the agenda for reform is to disaggregate the problem 
statement  and  undertake  reforms  which  are  gradual  as  well  as  specific  to  sectors.  A 
uniformist  approach  is  unnecessary.  It  has  constrained  the  civil  service  and  has  not 
allowed it to develop into diverse institutions suited to each sector’s requirements.  
Different branches of civil service require different approaches. The best option 
seems to be to support evolving practice and systems at the departmental level within 
each tier of government. Most important initiatives are taking place at the provincial level 
and  these  should  be  the  first  priority  for  support.  Federal  initiatives  and  institutions Musharraf Rasool Cyan  1254
should to provide professional support while leaving the direction and initiative with the 
provinces.  Removing  constraints  like  unified  pay  scales  or  other  such  policy  level 
decisions national level initiatives can be helpful. For the local government due to the 
smaller subsets of market available to each unit a higher level approach may be required. 
For sharing of experience and undertaking work on common themes provincial initiatives 
will be useful.  
Undertaking meaningful reform will require complementary actions. A matter of 
primary importance is improvement  in the  work environment and restoration of civil 
servants’ confidence in their jobs. Political executive should renew its commitment to a 
rule of law based management and evolve mechanisms to ensure that it does not give 
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